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THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS’ EXPANSION OF
THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM “PARENT” LEAVES
FUTURE QUESTIONS UNANSWERED
Ilana Sharan*
On August 30, 2016, the New York Court of Appeals in Brooke
S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., expanded the definition of the term
“parent,” overruling the twenty-five-year-old bright line rule that
limited standing to seek custody or visitation to traditional parents.
In 1991, the New York Court of Appeals decided Alison D. v.
!irginia M. where they defined “parent” to include only people who
have a biological or adoptive relationship with the child, reasoning
that the typical family consisted of a husband and wife. In many
cases subsequent to Alison D., the court attempted to alleviate the
harsh application this rule had on many parents and their children.
Finally, based on the major changes in the law and statistics
regarding nontraditional families, the court in Brooke S.B. found
this traditional definition became “unwor*able.” In revisiting the
question of what constitutes a parent for custody and visitation
purposes, the court held that if a nonbiological, nonadoptive parent,
by clear and convincing evidence, can prove a preconception
agreement to jointly raise the child, he or she has established
standing to seek custody or visitation rights. However, the court did
not answer whether a petitioner, in the absence of a preconception
agreement, could establish standing for a custody or visitation
proceeding. This Note argues that in the absence of a preconception
agreement a nonbiological, nonadoptive parent should have the
opportunity to establish standing under a functional approach that
considers the biological or adoptive parents’ consent, the functional
*
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parent’s intent when forming a relationship with the child, and the
relationship formed between the child and the functional parent.
INTRODUCTION
In Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., the New York Court of
Appeals rendered a landmark family law decision that brought New
York up to date with the majority of states that recognize parental
status of nonbiological, nonadoptive parents.1 Pursuant to New York
Domestic Relations Law § 70, which governs who may petition the
court for parental rights, only a “parent” has standing2 to seek
custody or visitation.3 However, New York’s Legislature has failed
to define who qualifies as a “parent” under this vague category,
leaving the courts to define and interpret the contours of this vague
term.4 Until recently, New York State had arguably the most
conservative laws regarding parental recognition in comparison to
other states.5 In Brooke S.B., the Court of Appeals finally began to
more liberally recognize the rights of nontraditional parents. The
1

See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d. 488, 490 (N.Y. 2016);
Alan Feuer, New York’s Highest Court Expands Definition of Parenthood, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/nyregion/newyork-court-parental-rights.html?_r=0; Karen Freifeld, N.Y High Court Broadens
Definition of Parent in Landmark Ruling, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-york-ruling-parent-idUSKCN1152LM.
2
Standing means that an individual is entitled to request this type of relief
from the court. In this case, the relief requested would be custody or visitation.
Without standing the petition would automatically be dismissed. See Standing,
LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/standing (last visited July
13, 2017) (“Standing . . . is capacity of a party to bring suit in court.”).
3
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1909).
4
See id.; Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 493–97; Debra H. v. Janice R., 930
N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29–30 (N.Y.
1991).
5
See Trudy Ring, New York State Expands Definition of Parent, ADVOCATE
(Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.advocate.com/families/2016/9/01/new-york-stateexpands-definition. The New York Court of Appeals was first faced with the
critical issue of how to define the term “parent” in Alison D. v. Virginia M., where
the court limited parental status to strictly biological parents. See Alison D, 572
N.E.2d at 29. Parental status was expanded somewhat to recognize adoptive
parents in In re Jacob. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995). These
precedent cases will be discussed further infra Part I.
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court expanded parental status to functional parents, recognizing
that biology and adoption are no longer determinative of parentchild relationships. Determining that the traditional view of
“parent”—which recognized only biological and adoptive parents—
was too restrictive for modern family dynamics, the court held that
nonbiological, nonadoptive parents could prove parental status by
showing a preconception agreement with the child’s traditional
parents to raise the child. While the court’s ruling received much
acclaim, it left important questions unanswered.
According to the court, “whether a partner without such an
agreement can establish standing and, if so, what factors a petitioner
must establish to achieve standing based on equitable estoppel are
matters left for another day, upon another record.”6 By leaving this
question unanswered, the court acknowledged the inevitability of a
functional parent, in the absence of a preconception agreement with
the child’s biological or adoptive parent, seeking to establish
parental status.7 Rather than foreclose this argument, the court’s
decision essentially invited future petitions regarding the legal status
of functional parents.8
As an alternative to requiring a formal preconception agreement
for recognizing parental status of nonbiological, nonadoptive
parents, the New York Court of Appeals should adopt a functional
approach to recognizing parental status of these nontraditional
parents.9 By failing to do so, the court’s decision neglects many

6

Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 501.
See id.
8
See id. at 500–01; Alton L. Abramowitz, Evolving Definition of ‘Parent’ in
Child Custody and Access; Divorce Law, N.Y. L. J. (Dec. 1, 2016).
9
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009); Bethany v. Jones, 378
S.W.3d 731, 738 (Ark. 2011); Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 172 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2006). See also Jason C. Beekman, In Search of Parity: Child
Custody/Visitation and Child Support for Lesbian Couples Under “Companion”
Cases Debra H. and In Re H.M., in CORNELL LAW SCH. GRADUATE STUDENT
PAPERS (May, 15, 2011). (“[C]ourts in a growing number of states have applied
long standing common law or equitable doctrines, including in loco parentis, de
facto parenthood, psychological parent, or parent by estoppel to conclude that a
person who is not [in a] biological or adoptive relationship with a child, but who
has functioned as a parent, is entitled to some rights and responsibilities with
respect to the child.”).
7
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individuals that this decision was intended protect.10 Parental figures
are necessary for a child’s wellbeing, so requiring a bright-line rule
recognizing parental status only with a formal preconception
agreement is insufficient to protect children from the harsh
consequences of losing such an important relationship. Instead, the
context in which the parent-child relationship was formed with the
nonbiological, nonadoptive parent should be given significance
under the law.11 Without taking context into account, many children
will experience the harsh consequences of terminating their
relationship with a primary caretaker.12 On the other hand, under this
Note’s proposed approach, judges would have discretion to inquire
as to the strength of this parent-child bond and determine whether
there would be significant effects on the child if standing was not
established.13
This Note analyzes how the recent New York Court of Appeals
holding in Brooke S.B. is insufficient to protect many functional
parents whose relationship with the child should be given legal
significance. This Note further argues that in the absence of a
preconception agreement, a nonbiological, nonadoptive parent
should be given the opportunity to establish standing to seek custody
or visitation rights. Part I outlines the pertinent case law leading
towards the expansion of the term parent. This part discusses Alison
D. v. Virginia M., the precedent case that barred all functional
parents standing to seek custody and visitation, and how courts have,
until recently, continuously applied its narrow definition. Part II
elaborates on Brooke S.B., the judicial decision that expanded
parental status to include nonbiological, nonadoptive parents who
had a valid preconception agreement and analyzes the implications
of this judicial decision. This part stresses that the New York Court
of Appeals’ formal requirement of a preconception agreement is
insufficient to protect a significant number of children and
nonbiological, nonadoptive parents and argues for a more functional
approach to recognizing parental status. Part III argues the
10

See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Family Law Academics In Support of
Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (No.
106569-08) [hereinafter Brief In Support of Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H.].
12
See id.
13
Id.
11
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effectiveness of a functional approach is evident by the numerous
states that have adopted a similar method. Part IV proposes a
solution for the New York Court of Appeals to adopt a more
functional analysis which would allow functional parents to seek
custody or visitation rights in the absence of a preconception
agreement. Additionally, this Note proposes factors a court should
take into account in a parental status determination hearing,
including consent of the biological parent, intent of the functional
parent, and the bond between the parent and child. This type of caseby-case inquiry as an alternative to requiring a preconception
agreement would further the New York Court of Appeals’ goal in
protecting children and functional parents from the harsh
consequences of being forced to sever strong emotional bonds.14
I. NEW YORK PRECEDENT AFFIRMING A LIMITED DEFINITION OF
PARENT
The definition of the term parent continues to cause heated
debate because it determines who may petition for parental rights
pursuant to New York Domestic Relations Law § 70.15 Domestic
Relations Law § 70 provides that:
The court, on due consideration, may award the
natural guardianship, charge and custody of such
child to either parent for such time, under such
regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions
and directions, as the case may require, and may at
any time thereafter vacate or modify such order. In
all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the
custody of the child in either parent, but the court
shall determine solely what is for the best interest of
the child, and what will best promote its welfare and
happiness, and make award accordingly.16
New York courts have historically interpreted this statute to
mean that only a parent has standing to seek custody or visitation,
14

See Brook S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 497–98.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1909); see id.; Debra H. v. Janice
R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 2010); Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
16
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1909).
15
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however, the language of the statute lacks guidance as to who is
considered to be a parent.17 As a result, New York courts are left
with significant discretion to determine who falls under this
definition.18 Traditionally, only biological or adoptive parents were
considered parents pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 70.19
In 1991, the New York Court of Appeals first interpreted
Domestic Relations Law § 70 in Alison D. v. Virginia M. with an
extremely limited definition of the term parent based on
heterosexual views of family relations.20 Two women, Alison and
Virginia, had been in a long-term relationship and made an
agreement to conceive a child through artificial insemination.21
Under this preconception agreement, Virginia would carry the child,
however both women would share in all parenting obligations and
responsibilities.22 Throughout the first few years of the child’s life,
Alison, the nonbiological mother, provided both financial and
emotional support for the child, and participated in all major
decision-making regarding the child.23 It was apparent that the child
considered both Alison and Virginia to be her mothers, evidenced
by the fact that the child called both women “mommy.”24
Additionally, the child used both of the mothers’ last names.25
Despite all the parental responsibilities Alison shared in and the
important role she played in the child’s life, when the couple ended
their relationship, the court held that Alison did not have standing to
seek visitation or custody.26
The court in Alison D. relied on an earlier case it decided, Ronald
FF. v. Cindy GG., in which the court held that where a biological or
adoptive parent is present, a third party may not interfere with the
custody of a child unless a court finds “grievous cause or
17

See id.; Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 497–98.
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490; Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 188–91;
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
19
See id.
20
See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
21
Id. at 28.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 28–29.
18
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necessity.”27 Alison was deemed a third party because she was not
a biological parent and therefore, in the absence of “grievous cause
or necessity,” the court determined it must not displace parental
custody from the child’s biological mother.28 The court also looked
at Domestic Relations Law § 7129 and § 72,30 which list categories
of nonparents who have standing to seek custody or visitation.31 The
court interpreted the failure of New York’s Legislature to include
functional parents on the list to mean that they did not intend to give
functional parents, like Alison, the right to custody or visitation.32
In denying Alison standing for visitation, the New York Court
of Appeals determined, based on the traditional understanding of a
family structure, that it is only the child’s biological mother and
father who have the right to custody or visitation.33 Although Alison
conceded that she was not the child’s biological mother, she argued
that she should retain parental status because she took on all of the
parenting responsibilities throughout the child’s life.34 In rejecting
this argument, the court ruled that “the word ‘parent’ in Domestic
Relations Law § 70 should be interpreted to preclude standing for a
de facto parent who, under a theory of equitable estoppel, might
otherwise be recognized as the child’s parent for visitation
purposes.”35 This holding proved to be a complete bar on functional
parents to establish parental status.36

27

Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29; Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77
(N.Y. 1987).
28
See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
29
See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1989) (allowing
siblings to petition for visitation).
30
See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2004) (allowing
grandparents to petition for visitation).
31
See id.; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1989); Alison D., 572
N.E.2d at 29.
32
See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 71 & 72).
33
See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 494 (N.Y. 2016); see
also Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 (noting that a child’s biological parents have the
right to the “care and custody of their child” unless they are deemed unfit).
34
See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 (arguing that she “acted as a “de facto”
parent or that she should be viewed as a parent ‘by estoppel’”).
35
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 494.
36
Id.
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This outcome was widely condemned for two reasons: it did not
account for same-sex couples, and it deprived children of parental
figures.37 One major criticism of the decision was the severe impact
it had on same-sex couples.38 The discriminatory effect of this
decision is due to the fact that it is impossible for both same-sex
partners to be biologically related to the child, while for
heterosexual relationships, both parents can have a biological tie to
the child.39 Furthermore, at the time of this decision, same-sex
couples could not marry, nor could a nonmarried partner adopt their
partner’s biological child. Therefore, at least one partner of a samesex couple who agreed to raise a child together would always be
presumed “a legal stranger in the eyes of the law.”40
Additionally, the court’s decision “f[ell] hardest” on the millions
of children raised in nontraditional families.41 Since Domestic
Relations Law § 70 requires custody and visitation proceedings
based on the best interest of the child,42 the court’s decision was
criticized for straying from the best interest approach and failing to
expressly consider the child’s welfare in providing a definition of
the term parent.43 Consequently, many lower courts in New York
37

See Brief In Support of Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H, supra note 11
(“That rule, much-criticized by scholars for its harm to both children and their
functional parents, bars legal recognition of a parent-child relationship absent a
biological or adoptive tie between the child and adult in question.”) Id. at 2.
38
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 497–98; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30–31
(1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting); Feuer, supra note 1.
39
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 498; Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique
of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 17, 22–23 (1999); RT
News, New York Expands Definition of Parent to Fit Non-Traditional Families,
RT AM. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.rt.com/usa/357708-nys-parenthooddefinition-updated/.
40
Brief In Support of Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H, supra note 11; John
Leland, Parenthood Denied by the Law: After a Same-Sex Couple’s Breakup, a
Custody
Battle,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
12,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/nyregion/after-a-same-sex-couples-breaku
p-a-custody-battle.html?_r=0.
41
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 494 (quoting Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye,
J., dissenting)).
42
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1909).
43
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 494–95 (citing Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30–33
(Kaye, J., dissenting)).
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were bound under Alison D. to sever bonds between children and
primary authority figures in the years following the decision.44
Columbia Law School Professor Suzanne B. Goldberg, an “expert
in sexuality and gender law,”45 strongly criticized the decision,
insisting that New York family law “has not caught up with the way
families live their lives, or the rest of New York law. And that gap
is causing tremendous damage.”46
Recognizing the damaging effects of its Alison D. decision, the
New York Court of Appeals subsequently attempted to counteract
the harsh consequences of this extremely narrow definition of
“parent,” while at the same time refusing to overrule it for 25
years.47 In 1995, the court held In re Jacob that a biological parent’s
partner who participates in parenthood responsibilities may legalize
their relationship with the child through adoption, which was
traditionally prohibited.48 The court reasoned that “from the
children’s perspective, permitting the adoptions allows the children
to achieve a measure of permanency with both parent figures and
avoids the sort of disruptive visitation battle we faced in Matter of
Alison D. v. Virginia M.”49 Adoption thus became the first option
for a nonbiological, same-sex partner to gain standing to seek
visitation and custody under the limited definition of Alison D.50
Subsequently in 2006, on the basis of the child’s best interest,
the court held in the Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D that where a
nonbiological father mistakenly asserts paternity, he is estopped
from denying his obligation to pay child support.51 The court’s goal
44

See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 20 A.D.3d 333, 333 (N.Y. 2005); Multari
v. Sorell, 287 A.D.2d 764, 766–67 (3rd Dep’t 2001).
45
About: Suzanne Goldberg, OFFICE OF UNIVERSITY LIFE: COLUM. UNIV.,
http://universitylife.columbia.edu/about/staff/suzanne-goldberg (last visited July
13, 2017).
46
Leland, supra note 40.
47
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 496; Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610,
611 (N.Y. 2006); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995); Zack Ford, New
York Court Expands Definition of ‘Parent’ to Recognize Same-Sex Couples,
THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/new-york-same-sexparenting-decision-2cf5352d8d20#.4qsj967nd.
48
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398.
49
Id. at 399.
50
Id. at 398; Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 495.
51
Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 611.
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here was to alleviate the financial consequence on a child raised by
only one parent.52 Under this holding, a nonbiological, nonadoptive
parent may be obligated to pay child support,53 yet has no standing
to seek custody or visitation.54 Shondel created a major
inconsistency with Alison D. because functional parents could be
burdened with the obligations of parenthood, but not receive any of
the benefits.55 Despite this major inconsistency, however, when
presented with similar facts in Debra H. v. Janice R., the New York
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Alison D. definition,56 but reached
a different holding based on the facts.57 In recognizing the parental
status of Debra, a nonbiological parent, the court relied on the
common law doctrine of comity to respect the parental status she
was granted under Vermont law.58 The court rejected the argument
to overrule Alison D. because the majority favored a bright-line rule,
insisting that it promoted certainty and uniformity in the event of a
breakup.59
The New York Court of Appeals continued to oppose arguments
advocating for functional parents’ rights until the legalization of
same-sex marriage, which required a revision of the law to reflect
the reality of nontraditional families raising children in New York
State.60 In recognizing the harm inflicted by Alison D.’s narrow
definition, in Brooke S.B. the New York Court of Appeals expanded
52

See id.
See id at 611–13.
54
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 498.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 496; Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 186–97 (N.Y. 2010).
57
See generally Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 196–97 (giving considerable
weight to the fact that the couple entered into a civil union in Vermont prior to the
child’s birth, the New York Court of Appeals respected the recognition of her
parental rights under Vermont law and determined New York law would not
impede on these rights).
58
Id. at 196 (citing Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of Houston, 404 N.E.2d
726, 730 (N.Y. 1980)) (“The doctrine of comity ‘does not of its own force compel
a particular course of action. Rather, it is an expression of one State’s entirely
voluntary decision to defer to the policy of another.’”).
59
Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 191–92.
60
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 503–04; Alex Silverman, New York Court
Expands Definition of Parenthood, CBS N.Y. (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2016/08/30/new-york-parent-ruling/.
53
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parental status of functional parents in limited situations,61 but failed
to acknowledge that there are alternative options that would be
sufficient to establish standing to seek custody or visitation.62 By
failing to acknowledge alternatives to establish standing, many
functional parents and their children are left unprotected by the
law.63
II. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS EXPANDS PARENTAL
RECOGNITION TO RESPECT MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND
PROMOTE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
In 2016, the New York Court of Appeals was provided the
opportunity to revise the precedent rule that limited parental status
to biological and adoptive parents when presented with Brooke S.B.
v. Elizabeth A.C.C.64 The court expanded the definition of a parent
to include functional parents who are able to prove a preconception
agreement, between the functional and biological parent, to raise the
child by clear and convincing evidence.65 However, the court
declined to use this case to consider alternative ways nonbiological,
nonadoptive parents could establish standing.66
In Brooke S.B., Brooke and Elizabeth agreed to conceive a child
together, although at the time of this agreement they were unable to
legally marry as a same-sex couple.67 Elizabeth became pregnant
through artificial insemination, while Brooke took the role of the
child’s functional parent, sharing in all parenthood
responsibilities.68 Throughout Elizabeth’s pregnancy, Brooke
regularly attended doctor appointments and cut the umbilical cord
at birth.69 The child took Brooke’s last name and referred to her as

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Abramowitz, supra note 8.
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500–01.
See discussion infra pp. 21–22.
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 497.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 491.
Id.
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“Mama B.”70 The year following the child’s birth, Elizabeth
returned to work, while Brooke stayed home to care for the child.71
Four years after the birth of the child, the women’s relationship
deteriorated and Elizabeth terminated contact between the child and
Brooke.72 Brooke commenced an action in family court requesting
joint custody and visitation.73 An attorney was appointed for the
child, who determined it was in the child’s best interest to grant
Brooke visitation based on his interactions with the child and his
knowledge of the circumstances.74 Elizabeth moved to dismiss on
the basis that Brooke lacked standing to seek custody and visitation
because she did not fall within the definition of a parent under Alison
D.75
Both the child’s attorney and Brooke opposed the motion,
insisting that Alison D. should be overruled to reflect the changes in
the law legalizing same-sex marriage and the best interest of the
parties’ child.76 Susan Sommer, Lambda Legal’s Director of
Constitutional Litigation, on Brooke’s behalf contended that%
the prevailing New York legal precedents do not
account for the myriad ways that people make
families, including same-sex couples, and that to
consider non-biological parents “legal strangers” to
the children they have cared for since birth is not in
the best interest of these children. New York’s
passage of the Marriage Equality Act and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2015 marriage ruling in Obergefell
v. Hodges call for greater respect for the families
formed by same-sex couples and their recognition as
full-fledged parents of their children.77

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See id.
77
Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth C.C., Summary, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.la
mbdalegal.org/in-court/cases/ny_brooke-sb_v_elizabeth-cc (last visited July 13,
2017).
71
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Despite these arguments, both lower courts denied Brooke’s
motion seeking custody and visitation, reasoning that she was
neither related to the child biologically or through adoption, nor did
she marry the child’s biological parent,78 and therefore they were
bound by Alison D.79
After analyzing the definition rendered in Alison D. in terms of
recent legal foundations regarding same-sex families,80 the New
York Court of Appeals held that a functional parent could establish
standing to seek custody or visitation pursuant to Domestic
Relations Law § 70 by proving through clear and convincing
evidence a preconception agreement to jointly raise the child.81
Once a court establishes that the petitioner meets this evidentiary
burden, the court would then proceed with a typical custody or
visitation proceeding as if between two biological or adoptive
parents.82
The court relied on two main reasons in its decision to overrule
Alison D. in favor of a more practical approach.83 The court looked
at both the discriminatory application the prior rule had on same-sex
couples and the harm it inflicted on the millions of children raised
in families with same-sex parents.84 With respect to the prior
holding’s discriminatory application to same-sex parents, the court
found it problematic in light of recently enacted laws governing
marriage equality.85 The court reasoned that because of the
legalization of same-sex marriage, both in New York86 and
nationwide,87 the heterosexual concepts underlying the traditional
determination of parental rights in New York were no longer
dispositive.88
78

Brooke S.B, 61 N.E.3d at 491.
Id.
80
See id. at 497–500.
81
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490.
82
See id. at 501.
83
Id at 497–500.
84
See id.
85
Id. at 498.
86
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011).
87
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2599–605 (2015).
88
Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498 (N.Y. 2016) (“Alison
D.’s foundational premise of heterosexual parenting and nonrecognition of same79
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In 2011, New York legalized same-sex marriage under the
Marriage Equality Act.89 The New York Legislature’s intent in
enacting this statute was to ensure equal treatment of same-sex
couples under the law.90 Therefore, the statute also mandates that
the state government give equal treatment to same-sex and oppositesex marriages regarding legal status, privileges, benefits, and
responsibilities.91 The New York legislature recognized that stable
family dynamics help strengthen society, and concluded the
legalization of same-sex marriage would be beneficial in New York
State.92
Four years later, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court of
the United States ruled that the fundamental constitutional right to
marry should be interpreted to include the right to marry another
sex couples is unsustainable, particularly in light of the enactment of same-sex
marriage in New York State, and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Obergefell v. Hodges, which noted that the right to marry provides benefits not
only for same-sex couples, but also the children being raised by those couples.”)
(citation omitted).
89
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011) (“A marriage that is
otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are
of the same or different sex.”).
90
Id. (“It is the intent of the legislature that the marriages of same-sex and
different-sex couples be treated equally in all respects under the law. The omission
from this act of changes to other provisions of law shall not be construed as a
legislative intent to preserve any legal distinction between same-sex couples and
different-sex couples with respect to marriage. The legislature intends that all
provisions of law which utilize gender-specific terms in reference to the parties to
a marriage, or which in any other way may be inconsistent with this act, be
construed in a gender-neutral manner or in any way necessary to effectuate the
intent of this act.”).
91
Id. (“No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit,
privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether deriving from
statute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other
source of law, shall differ based on the parties to the marriage being or having
been of the same sex rather than a different sex.”). For example, in Wendy G-M.
v. Erin G-M., where a dispute arose between a birth mother and her wife, a New
York Supreme Court held that the common law presumption of consent to
conceive a child through artificial insemination by an anonymous donor must be
applied equally to same-sex couples as it is to heterosexual couples based on the
Marriage Equality Act. Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 860–61
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
92
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(2) (2011) (describing the legislative intent).
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individual of the same sex.93 The Court expressed that prohibiting
same-sex marriage deprived a child raised by a same-sex couple of
a safeguard of having married parents94 and attested to the harm and
humiliation banning same-sex marriages had on the “hundreds of
thousands of children [who] are presently being raised by [samesex] couples.”95 Based on the legalization of same-sex marriage, the
New York Court of Appeals agreed that the holding in Alison D.
lacked continued vitality because of the discriminatory effect it had
on same-sex couples.96
The second reason influencing the New York Court of Appeals
to overrule Alison D. was that the Alison D. definition completely
failed to consider the child’s best interest, which is inconsistent with
New York’s family law jurisprudence.97 In an amicus brief for the
American Civil Liberties Union, attorney William Rubenstein
argued that “a restrictive reading of parent which denies petitioner
standing, burdens the constitutional rights of the child by
establishing an irrebuttable presumption that visitation by a co-

93

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); NORTHERN
TRUST, OBERGEFELL V. HODGES IMPACT ON SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP
RECOGNITION
1
(2015),
https://www.northerntrust.com/documents/articles/wealth-management/insightslgbt-financial-planning.pdf. According to Justice Kennedy, the plaintiffs
requested “equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The constitution grants them that
right.” Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2608.
94
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2600–01.
95
Id. at 2600.
96
See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 495–500 (N.Y.
2016).
97
See id. at 498–500; Brief In Support of Petitioner-Appellant, Debra H,
supra note 11. See generally New York Custody and Visitation Schedules,
CUSTODY CHANGE, https://www.custodyxchange.com/new-york/visitationschedule.php (last visited July 13, 2017) (describing how judges take into
consideration the best interest of a child in any matter involving that child). Under
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (“UMDA”), a court is to consider a list of
factors in determining the best interest of the child such as, the desires of the
child’s parents; the desire of the child; the encounter and development of the
relationship between the child and parent, as well as a relationship the child
creates with a sibling or others that would affect the child; the child’s ability to
adjust to the community, including the school and home; and the health of all
parties involved. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §402 (amended 1973).
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parent is never in the child’s best interest.”98 Acknowledging that
the precedent definition did not give any weight to the best interest
of the child, the court wrote, “in Alison D., we narrowly defined the
term ‘parent,’ thereby foreclosing ‘all inquiry into the child’s best
interest’ in custody and visitation cases involving parental figures
who lacked biological or adoptive ties to the child.”99
The New York Court of Appeals found that, in light of the
statistics illustrating that there are a significant number of same-sex
partners raising children in New York,100 as well as the social
science revealing the harsh impact separating children from parental
figures has on the child,101 the Alison D. definition was no longer
workable on the basis that such a restrictive definition completely
disregarded the welfare of the child.102 First, census data show a
significant number of same-sex partners raising children in New
York.103 Based on this finding, scholars have argued that the
increase in diverse family relationships transforms the concept of
the average family dynamic, insisting biology should no longer be a
determinative factor of a parent-child relationship.104 Even when
98

Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
99
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 498.
100
Id. at 499 (citing GARY J. GATES & ABIGAIL M. COOKE, WILLIAMS INST.,
NEW YORK CENSUS SNAPSHOT: 2010 1 (2010), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla
.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010Snapshot_New-York_v2.pdf).
101
See Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to a
Relational Right, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 6–7 (2009); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation: Unrecognized Parents
and the Story of Alison D v. Virginia M., 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 307, 330–31
(2008); Amanda Barfield, Note, The Intersection of Same-Sex and Stepparent
Visitation, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 257, 259–60 (2014); Mary Ellen Gill, Note, Third
Party Visitation in New York: Why the Current Standing Statute Is Failing Our
Families, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 481, 488–89 (2006). See also Joseph G.
Arsenault, Comment, “Family” but Not “Parent”: The Same-Sex Coupling
Jurisprudence of the New York Court of Appeals, 58 ALB. L. REV. 813, 834–36
(1995).
102
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 495–97.
103
See supra note 100.
104
See id. at 499–500 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–64
(2000)); Roy L. Reardon & William T. Russel Jr., Overturning Precedent on
Meaning of Parenting; New York Court of Appeals Roundup, 256 N.Y. L. J. 3, 3
(2016).
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Alison D. was decided, statistics showed that over eight million
children throughout the United States were raised by same-sex
parents.105 Furthermore, over fifteen million children at that time
were raised by two parents, where at least one parent was not
biologically related to the child.106 Over the years these numbers
increased drastically, especially in New York, as a result of the
changes in the law and society welcoming same-sex couples.107
The court also referenced social science reports to support its
finding that the narrow precedent definition of the term parent was
contrary to the best interest of countless children of nonbiological,
nonadoptive parents residing in New York State. These reports
revealed the harm inflicted on these children as a result of the brightline rule that denied all functional parents the right to have contact
with the child.108 The consensus among family law academics and
child psychologists is that children benefit from forming meaningful
relationships with two primary parent figures.109 Additionally,
forensic psychologists have testified in custody and visitation
proceedings that prohibiting the child from having a relationship
105

Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 499 (citing Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
N.E.2d 27, 30 (1991) (Kaye, J., Dissenting)).
106
Id.
107
Id. (citing GATES & COOKE, supra note 103, at 1); Reardon & Russel Jr.,
supra note 104, at 3.
108
Id. (citing Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental
to a Relational Right, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2009)); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation: Unrecognized Parents
and the Story of Alison D v. Virginia M., 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 307 (2008);
Amanda Barfield, Note, The Intersection of Same-Sex and Stepparent Visitation,
23 J.L. & POL’Y 257, 259–60 (2014); Mary Ellen Gill, Note, Third Party
Visitation in New York: Why the Current Standing Statute Is Failing Our
Families, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 481, 488–89 (2006); Joseph G. Arsenault,
Comment, “Family” but not “Parent”: The Same-Sex Coupling Jurisprudence of
the New York Court of Appeals, 58 ALB. L. REV. 813, 834–36 (1995)).
109
Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 292 (N.M. 2012); Brian Alexander,
Family Income- Not Married Parents-More Apt to Impact Kids’ Well Being, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/familyincome-not-married-parents-more-apt-impact-kids-well-n313486. For years,
scholars insisted that, “children benefit from continued contact with functional
parents, and that the law must recognize the importance of these relationships in
adjudicating familial disputes.” Brief In Support of Petitioner-Appellant, Debra
H, supra note 11, at 6.
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with the functional parent is detrimental to the child’s well-being.110
Consequently, the New York Court of Appeals provided one
option—entering into a preconception agreement—for functional
parents to establish parental status in the eyes of the law.111
Although the Brooke S.B. holding was a significant step in
achieving fairer parenting laws by giving functional parents the
opportunity to establish parental status under certain
circumstances,112 the New York Court of Appeals declined to
consider other situations in which a nonbiological, nonadoptive
parent would be able to establish standing to seek custody or
visitation.113 The court provided that,
Because we necessarily decided these cases based on
the facts presented to us, it would be premature for
us to consider adopting a test for situations in which
a couple did not enter into a pre-conception
agreement. Accordingly, we do not now decide
whether, in a case where a biological or adoptive
parent consented to the creation of a parent-like
relationship between his or her partner and child after
conception, the partner can establish standing to seek
visitation and custody.114
Had the court wanted to find that a functional parent was
prohibited from establishing standing for parental rights in a
situation where the biological parent consented to the parent-child
relationship after conception of the child, they likely would have
done so. However, the court did not preclude this argument nor did
the court provide any rationale as to why the adoption of a functional
approach would be anything but beneficial.115
110

See generally Stephen P. Herman, I Have Two Mommies, AAPL
NEWSLETTER (Jan. 2014), http://www.aapl.org/docs/newsletter/January%202014
.pdf (recalling his experience in a visitation proceeding, forensic psychologist
Stephen P. Herman writes, “I testified that the child was equally attached to both
of her mommies and it would be detrimental to cut off all contact with her nonbiological mother.”).
111
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 501.
112
See id.
113
See id. at 500.
114
Id. at 500–01.
115
See id. at 501.
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Given the myriad ways to create families today that rely on
parent-child relationships in multiple aspects of everyday life,116 the
bright-line rules requiring biology, adoption, marriage, or a
preconception agreement117 do not adequately protect the interests
of the child and functional parent. “The reality of contemporary
society is that family life today takes many different forms and as
part of that development, ideas about the meaning of parentage are
changing.”118 Under the current law there will be instances where
nonbiological, nonadoptive parents who play a pertinent role in the
child’s life are prohibited from seeking custody or visitation because
either they are unable to prove a preconception agreement by clear
and convincing evidence or a preconception agreement never
occurred.119 New York law should recognize that a functional
approach as an alternative is required in order to protect all families,
including ones formed in diverse ways that function equivalently to
traditional families. Without an alternative method for functional
parents to establish parental status, a significant amount of parentchild relationships will be unprotected by the law.
One major reason why significant amounts of children and
functional parents will be unprotected by the Brooke S.B. holding is
because a preconception agreement is not the strongest indicator of
a parent-child relationship. Despite the fact that the functional parent
could be the child’s primary caregiver, and it would be in the child’s
best interest to maintain this relationship, he or she could be stripped
of all legal rights as the child’s parent absent a preconception
agreement.120 For example, suppose a biological parent and a
nonbiological parent jointly raise a child but made no agreement to
do so before the child was conceived. Instead, the two parents agreed
116

See K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. 2012) (quoting
Commonwealth ex rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416, 419 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1976)) (allowing parent by estoppel due to the fact that “relying upon the
representation of the parental relationship, a child naturally and normally extends
his love and affection to the putative parent”); Brief for Family Law Academics
as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Debra H., supra note 11.
117
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 202 (N.Y. 2010).
118
Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Collaborative Reproduction and Rethinking
Parentage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 43, 44 (2008).
119
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 501.
120
See id.
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post-conception to raise the child. Under the current law, that
formality would be enough to sever the parent-child relationship.121
Continuing with the hypothetical, after the child was born the
biological parent went back to work, while the nonbiological parent
quit her career to stay home and care for the child. Upon the
termination of their relationship when the child is five, the biological
parent seeks to terminate the relationship between the child and
nonbiological parent. However, due to her time-consuming career
and long hours, the biological parent wants to hire a twenty-fourhour live-in babysitter to care for the child outside school hours.
Although the biological parent acknowledges it would be in the
child’s best interest to maintain a relationship with the nonbiological
parent rather than a babysitter, she refuses to allow the relationship
to continue out of spite. Under the current law, the nonbiological
parent and the child would be forced to sever their relationship.122
As the hypothetical illustrates, the current law under Brooke S.B.
fails to provide protection for the functional parent and the child
because the context of the parent-child relationship is neglected in
the inquiry of whether the functional parent established standing.123
Additionally, a functional approach should be adopted as an
alternative to requiring a preconception agreement because under
the current law there will be instances where the parties participate
in a preconception agreement, but the functional parent is unable to
prove the agreement existed by clear and convincing evidence.124
While a functional parent can enter into a preconception agreement
in writing to easily satisfy this condition, however, the ordinary
individual involved in a case of this nature is unlikely to be aware
that this is the law and is unlikely to seek advice of a lawyer at the
high point in the couple’s relationship when they agree to conceive
a child. This creates an unfair disadvantage to individuals unfamiliar
with the law. Furthermore, without an agreement that is reduced to
writing, a standing hearing will consist of a “he said'she said”
problem.125 An alternative functional approach should be adopted
121
122
123
124
125

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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under New York law to avoid these issues and to better protect
diverse family forms. This is especially so when comparing New
York’s approach to other states which have adopted more functional
approaches to recognizing parental status and have recognized de
facto parental relationships.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
New York law should recognize that there are alternative ways
for functional parents to establish sufficient evidence to infer a
parental relationship with the child. As an alternative to requiring a
preconception agreement, the New York Court of Appeals should
adopt a flexible approach that considers the specific dynamic of each
family. Academic scholars have argued that courts should give
weight to whether the parents, the child, and others have carried on
in a parent-child relationship or recognized the relationship between
a parent and child.126 Likewise, states that have adopted this type of
approach give considerable weight to a variation of three important
elements, including consent of the biological or adoptive parent,
intent of the functional parent to form a parent-child bond, and the
development of the relationship between the child and the functional
parent.127
The effectiveness of this type of functional approach is evident
by the numerous states that have adopted similar methods.128

126

See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18
LAW & INFO 1, 5 (2000); Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and
Who’s Out?, 62 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 269, 270 (1991) (insisting that a parentchild relationship should be recognized where the parent and child “share
affection and resources, think of one another as family members, and present
themselves as such”); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic
Definition of “Family”, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 99 (1990); Dana C. Wright,
Inheritance Equity: Reforming the Inheritance Penalties Facing Children in
Nontraditional Families, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 42 (2015–2016).
127
Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Debra H., supra note 11, at 4.
128
See id. (“Courts around the country have likewise embraced these criteria
as they have abandoned the formalistic conception of the family reflected in
Alison D. Importantly, these courts have exercised their well-established equitable
powers to adopt these criteria, recognizing functional parent-child relationships
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Statutory law in Connecticut, Delaware, Texas, and the District of
Columbia, among others, expanded parental recognition to
functional parents.129 For example, under the District of Columbia
Code, a petitioner establishes status as a de facto parent where the
biological or adoptive parent agreed to allow the functional parent
to take on parental responsibilities, he or she formed an emotional
bond with the child, and resided with the child for at least ten months
of the year preceding the commencement of the action.130 Likewise,
Delaware law recognizes a functional parent as someone who took
on parental obligations and privileges, with the consent of the
biological or adoptive parent, for a sufficient amount of time to form
an intimate parent-child relationship.131
Many other states have expanded parental recognition of
nonbiological, nonadoptive parents through case law.132 The first
state to expand parental rights in such a way was Pennsylvania,133
where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that “a person may put
himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the
obligations incident to the parental relationship without going
through the formality of a legal adoption.”134 Soon after, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a petitioner must meet four
that best serve the interests of legal parents and fairly addressing the interests of
functional parents.”).
129
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT
FAMILIES 6 (2016), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Legal
_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf (acknowledging that many states [] have
enacted statutes to expand parental recognition of functional parents, such as
“Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and the District of
Columbia”) [hereinafter NCLR, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES].
130
D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(B)(2016).
131
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(C) (2017).
132
NCLR, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES, supra note 129. These
states “include: Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.” Id. at 5.
133
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459, 502 (1990).
134
Id. (quoting Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)).
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elements in order to establish status as a de facto parent.135 This fourpart test considers the consent of the biological or adoptive parent,
intent of the functional parent regarding parental responsibilities,
whether the functional parent and the child resided together, and
whether a parent-child relationship was formed.136 This test was
adopted by many other state courts, including New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Maine, and Washington.137 Similarly, a North
Carolina decision held that a nonbiological, nonadoptive parent
established standing where the petitioner proved intent to form a
parent-child relationship, the parties jointly made decisions on
behalf of the child, and the parent and child formed an intimate
relationship.138 Only a few states now have a complete bar on
awards of custody and visitation for functional parents who equally
participate in parenthood responsibilities.139
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) also supports giving
nonbiological, nonadoptive parents the opportunity to establish
standing to seek custody or visitation based on a functional
approach.140 Recognizing that a nonbiological, nonadoptive parental
figure may be essential to the welfare of the child, the ALI Principles
provide two different options, including parent by estoppel and de
facto parent, to establish parental status as a functional parent.141
Parent by estoppel can be established where the petitioner is ordered
to pay child support on behalf of the child, where the petitioner
135

In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wisc. 1995).
Id. at 421.
137
Beekman, supra note 9 at 25–6. See also NCLR, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
LGBT FAMILIES, supra note 129, at 5 (“Some states, including Indiana, Maine,
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Washington, have case law recognizing that a nonbiological and non-adoptive parent can have all of the rights and responsibilities
of parentage based on the following factors: her acceptance of the responsibilities
of parentage, living with the child, the legal parent’s fostering a parent-child
relationship between the child and the non-biological and non-adoptive parent,
and the existence of a bonded parent-child relationship.”).
138
Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 220–21 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
139
NCLR, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES, supra note 129, at 5.
140
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Horton Looks at the ALI Principles, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 151, 154–55 (2002).
141
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
136
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cohabitated with the child for at least two years and had a reasonable
belief, based on the representation of the other parent, that he or she
was a co-parent, or where the petitioner resided with the child for at
least two years and participated in parental responsibilities, pursuant
to the consent of the legal parent.142 A functional parent can
establish de facto parental status where the petitioner is “an adult
who lived with the child and who regularly performed at least half
of the caretaking functions with respect to the child, with the consent
of at least one of the child’s parents and without expectation of
financial compensation.”143 Thus, it is clear that the drafters of the
ALI Principles support the “widespread consensus” for law reform
to recognize functional parents.144
A functional approach under New York law, similar to those
mentioned above, would be beneficial because it is consistent with
the court’s broadened definition of a parent, and also mitigates the
court’s concern about infringing on the legal parent’s fundamental
rights.145 In Brooke S.B., the New York Court of Appeals
emphasized that they expanded the definition of parent to promote
the best interest of the child and protect the rights of functional,
same-sex parents.146 Adopting a functional approach as an
alternative to a formal preconception agreement will further these
goals.147 It would “meet the needs of contemporary families by
ensuring that family realities are reflected in law, particularly given
that many children are no longer raised by two married parents.”148
Given contemporary society, there will be many situations in which
142

Id.
Id.
144
Id. See also Beekman, supra note 9 (suggesting that functional parents
should be given the opportunity to establish standing to seek custody or
visitation); Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Theory of Family: The American
Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV.
923, 936–38 (2001) (arguing in favor of uniform adoption of the ALI Principles
because it treats the best interest of the child as a priority).
145
See Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Debra H., supra note 11, at 7.
146
See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498–501 (N.Y.
2016).
147
See Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Debra H., supra note 11, at 6–7.
148
Id. at 7.
143
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a functional parent takes on all parental responsibilities, but did not
make a preconception agreement to raise the child.149 Without
creating an alternative way for functional parents to establish
parental status, both children and functional parents will suffer.150
Therefore, a functional approach would best-serve the New York
Court of Appeals’ consideration of the functional parent’s equality
and the best interest of the child.151
One might argue that giving nonbiological, nonadoptive parents
status under the law infringes on the biological or adoptive parent’s
fundamental right to control and care for their child.152 However, a
functional approach mitigates this risk by requiring the legal
parent’s consent when determining whether to expand parental
rights to functional parents.153 There is a consensus around the
country that a legal parent retains a fundamental right to raise the
child in the way he or she chooses.154 Therefore, “the fundamental
nature of those rights mandates caution in expanding the definition
of that term [parent] and makes the element of consent of the
biological or adoptive parent critical.”155 Indeed, there are
alternative ways to ensure that the biological or adoptive parent
consented to the functional parent’s relationship with the child
149

See id.
See id.
151
See id.; Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a
Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 516 (1993);
Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents?
The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for Parental Equality, 40 FAM.
L. Q. 23, 46–48 (2006); Martin Guggenheim, Rediscovering Third Party
Visitation Under the Common Law in New York: Some Uncommon Answers, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 153–54 (2009); Polikoff, supra note 133, at
463–64.
152
See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 494, 499 (N.Y.
2016).
153
See generally Gilbert. A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional
Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD.
L. REV. 358, 385–390 (1994) (illustrating how a functional approach takes into
account concerns about consent from the biological parent when expanding
parental rights to functional parents).
154
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–66 (2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
155
See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 499.
150
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absent a formal preconception agreement.156 For example, under
Wisconsin law, which was adopted by many other states, 157 consent
of the biological or adoptive parent is an element the petitioner must
prove.158 Similarly, under the ALI Principles, de facto parenthood
can be established by residing with the child for two years and
having an arrangement with the biological or adoptive parent to
provide parental support.159 Each of these approaches address the
concern regarding consent of the legal parent to avoid infringing on
that parent’s fundamental right.160
From surveying other states’ approaches to recognizing
functional parents, there are numerous solutions to the New York
Court of Appeals’ unanswered question of whether there are
alternative ways for a functional parent to establish parental status
in the absence of a preconception agreement.161 By adopting a
functional approach as an alternative to requiring a preconception
agreement, the court “can bring New York’s family law into step
with the general trend, identified and endorsed by family law
academics throughout the State and country.”162 Similar to other
states, a case-specific inquiry considering family dynamics and
parent-child interest should govern the court’s analysis.
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See Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Debra H., supra note 11, at 9–10.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 18–23.
159
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
160
See Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Debra H., supra note 11, at 9; Beekman, supra note 9.
161
See D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2016); In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,
419 (Wisc. 1995); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008);
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002). See also NCLR, LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES, supra note 129, at 6 (“Many states have
enacted statues giving de facto parents or persons who have assumed a true
parental role in a child’s life a right to seek visitation or custody.”).
162
Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Debra H., supra note 11, at 3.

DEFINITION OF THE TERM “PARE#T”

783

IV. SOLUTION
As a result of the New York Court of Appeals’ unanswered
question of recognizing parental status for functional parents in the
absence of a preconception agreement, instances will occur where a
parent-child relationship is unprotected by the law, negatively
impacting both the child and functional parent. To better protect
these families, a functional approach should be adopted that is inline with other states’ approaches as an alternative to requiring a
formal preconception agreement. Such an approach envisions a
three-part test to establish standing. A court would consider: 1)
whether the biological or adoptive parent at any time consented to
the functional parent’s intimate, parent-child relationship with the
child; 2) whether the nonbiological, nonadoptive parent intended to
take on the privileges, responsibilities, and obligations of
parenthood; and 3) whether the functional parent and the child
formed a sentimental relationship.
The first factor requires a court to find that the legal parent
consented to the parental relationship between his or her partner and
the child. “The legal parent’s consent to and encouragement of a
functional parent-child relationship is essential to the recognition of
that relationship.”163 This is to ensure that the biological or adoptive
parent’s fundamental rights are protected, which was a critical issue
that the New York Court of Appeals was concerned with when
hesitating to expand parental recognition to functional parents.164 It
is uncontested that consent at some point in time from the biological
parent is required, whether the consent be in the form of a
preconception agreement, which was the case in Brooke S.B.,165 an
agreement after conception, or consent that is implied from the
actions and representations of the legal parent.166
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Id. at 8.
See id. at 9; Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 499 (N.Y.
2016); Polikoff, supra note 133, at 490.
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Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488 at 500–01.
166
See D.C. CODE § 16-831.01; In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421;
Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d at 61–62; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
See also Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
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Beyond a written or oral agreement, there are numerous ways in
which a legal parent can consent to a parent-child relationship. For
example, New York courts could find implied consent where the
child uses the functional parent’s last name or there is joint decisionmaking between the parties regarding the best interest of the
child.167 Additionally, a court might find consent where the legal
parent induced the parent-child relationship, such as requesting that
the functional parent treat the child as family and encouraging the
functional parent to foster a relationship between the child and his
or her extended family. Another relevant factor in establishing
consent should be whether the legal parent insisted that the
functional parent take on significant financial burdens on behalf of
the child that are typically the responsibility of a parent, such as
college tuition. Although consent is necessary to protect the
fundamental rights of the biological or adoptive parent, there are
alternative ways to infer consent other than a preconception
agreement.
Second, a court should consider whether the nonbiological,
nonadoptive parent intended to take on the role of parenthood. This
element is established where the functional parent voluntarily takes
on parental responsibilities.168 This would be a fact-specific inquiry,
but facts sufficient to meet this requirement could include whether
the functional parent provides financial support on behalf of the
child, holds the child out to be his or her own, participates in
decision-making, spends sufficient time with the child in the
absence of the legal parent, or takes time off of work to engage in
parental obligations.169
Third, a court should analyze the development of the parentchild relationship. Although no one factor would be dispositive, the
court should consider whether the functional parent provided
support for the child, either financially, intellectually, or
emotionally, as well as whether the functional parent and the child
resided together, the duration of the relationship, the daily
Debra H., supra note 11, at 9–10 (elaborating on the importance of consent from
the legal parent).
167
Brief for Family Law Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Debra H., supra note 11, at 9–10.
168
Id. at 11.
169
Id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 39, at 24–25.
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encounters of the functional parent and child, whether the sharing of
affection is mutual, and the child’s desires.
Under this three-part test, the functional parent seeking to obtain
parental status would bear the burden of proving each element upon
dissolution of his or her relationship with the child’s legal parent.
This type of approach gives the judge discretion in determining
whether both parents and the child were held out as a family, and
whether it would be unfair to deny recognition of this relationship
upon dissolution of the parents’ relationship. This approach also
allows a judge to consider the hardship a child would face from
being forced to terminate his or her relationship with a significant
adult figure while simultaneously placing the burden on the
presumed functional parent to prove that such a relationship should
not be terminated.
CONCLUSION
After years of harsh consequences resulting from the 25-yearold precedent in Alison D., the New York Court of Appeals in
Brooke S.B. finally expanded the definition of a parent to include
parental rights of functional parents.170 Albeit limited, the court’s
holding relaxed the complete bar of parental recognition for samesex couples, as well as heterosexual couples who form families in
nontraditional ways, by providing an option for nonbiological,
nonadoptive parents to establish parental status in the form of a
preconception agreement. The decision pushed New York family
law in the right direction of achieving the fairest outcome in the
event of a relationship termination, however there is more work to
be done. The court refused to decide whether a functional parent
may establish standing to seek custody or visitation in the absence
of a preconception agreement, leaving the door open for potential
challenges to functional parents seeking a parental status
determination.171
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Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490; see Reardon & Russel, supra note 104;
Silverman, supra note 60.
171
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500 (reasoning that an expansion of standing
to include partners without pre-conception arrangements would be premature).
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Consistent with multiple states that have flexible parenting
laws,172 the New York Court of Appeals should adopt a functional
approach as an alternative to requiring a formal preconception
agreement. In order to promote the welfare of the child and protect
the rights of the functional parent, a court should determine whether,
based on the facts of each case, the child’s legal parents consented
to the parent-child relationship, whether the functional parent
intended to fulfill parental responsibilities, and whether a parentchild relationship was actually formed. By satisfying each of these
prongs, a functional parent would establish standing to petition the
court for custody or visitation, which would then result in a custody
or visitation proceeding that would be determined in the best interest
of the child.
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See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.10 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201
(2013); Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881 (Pa. 1977) (refusing to reject
stepparent’s visitation privileges because of status as a stepparent); In re H.S.H.K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435–36 (Wisc. 1995) (holding that the court has equitable
powers to grant visitation when a parent-like relationship exists); Mason v.
Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 64–68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that former
domestic partner of natural parent had standing to seek custody of a child
conceived during a domestic partnership).

